South Africans do not deserve load-shedding

Two former Eskom chief executives, Matshela Koko and Andre de Ruyter, have independently said South Africans should not suffer through load-shedding.

In a column, Engineering Risk Assessments and Why South Africans Do Not Deserve Load-shedding (see full column below), Koko shared his views on continued power cuts.

Koko said the condition of South Africa’s infrastructure, including the low voltage networks and power generation plants, suggests there is a severe problem with maintenance.

He said one of the main problems is that Eskom’s executive committee and board don’t have a solid appreciation of Eskom’s engineering risks and plant conditions today.

“This is why the unplanned capability loss factor post-unit outages is 34%. It should be less than 10%,” Koko said.

“The partial load losses are more than 6,000 MW when they should never exceed 3,000 MW in summer.”

Isabel Fick, Eskom’s general manager for system operations, revealed that variability over the rest of the network is about 4,000 MW.

“It means the load-shedding prognosis in the next 24 hours ranges from no load-shedding up to four stages of load-shedding,” Koko said. “Therefore, managing plant reliability and predictivity is crucial.”

He urged Eskom to look at what worked between 2015 to 2017 when South Africa experienced very little load-shedding.

It included accurately predicting breakdowns, making risk-based engineering decisions, and focussing on turbine procurement and maintenance.

“Eskom should go back to basics. South Africans do not deserve load-shedding,” Koko said.

Another former Eskom CEO, Andre de Ruyter, independently said that South Africans should not accept load-shedding.

Speaking to Nuuspod, De Ruyter said after 14 years of load-shedding, many South Africans have grown accustomed to it and perceive it as normal.

“Load-shedding is not normal. We should not allow it to become normal. We should not accept that it is the way it is,” he said.

He cited poet Dylan Thomas, who wrote, “Rage, rage against the dying of the light”. “We need a bit more rage,” De Ruyter said.

---

Engineering Risk Assessments and Why South Africans Do Not Deserve Load-shedding, by Matshela Koko.

A cursory look at the condition of our infrastructure – the water supply and sewer systems, the networks of highways and railways, bridges, medium and low voltage networks, and the power generation plants that we, by and large, take for granted – suggests there is a severe problem with how the maintenance basis, operating basis and the safety case of these assets are being managed.   

It will take billions upon billions of rands and many years to put things back in shape. It will ball down to the political leadership we will inherit after the 2024 national elections.

Some of the infrastructure is fifty or more years old and was neither designed nor expected to last forever. Ideally, such infrastructure should have been replaced and expanded continuously to keep it in reasonably sound condition and to meet the projected demand.

The South African Institution of Civil Engineering (SAICE) Infrastructure Report Cards completed in 2022 reported that the overall public infrastructure “is not coping with normal demand and is poorly maintained.

The public will likely be subjected to severe inconvenience and even danger without prompt action.” This was the worst assessment recorded by SAICE since the Infrastructure Report Cards were first published in 2006.

The electricity infrastructure is no different. In its application for leave to appeal the ruling of the Gauteng Division of the High Court on December 1, 2023, Eskom avers that “The decision by Eskom to defer the maintenance of its fleet was historical … if Eskom did not defer maintenance, power station units would have been immediately taken offline, exacerbating the electricity shortage and thus causing higher levels of load-shedding.

Eskom thus faced the difficult decision between an immediate interruption of electricity supply (and the consequent harms of such interruption) and a future possible interruption of electricity supply. Whatever Eskom’s decision, therefore, power supply would likely have been interrupted.”

The Court ruled that load-shedding is unconstitutional, and the minister of electricity was instructed to prevent load-shedding in police stations, public schools, and hospitals by January 31, 2024.

Eskom deferred maintenance from 2008 to 2010 to keep the lights on in the 2010 FIFA World Cup build-up. It was the Keep the Lights On (KLO) Strategy.

The power system was constrained, and the electricity reserve margin in 2008 was 2% instead of the desired 15% – the consequence of the mistakes in the 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy.

We procured the engineering know-how from RWE nPower in the United Kingdom to manage plant reliability risks in a constrained power system with ageing power stations. It was the Engineering Risk Assessment Process (ERAP).

ERAP became the critical success factor for the Technical Governance Committee of Eskom. Dr Steve Lennon chaired the Committee. The condition of the power island—not the balance of the plant, was assessed system by system.

The condition of the power island sets the expected level of plant performance, particularly the day-to-day reliability of the power plants. The plant condition degrades with plant operation and time. The degradation rate depends on the level of maintenance spending and operating excursions.

The balance of the plant has a sufficient level of redundancies. There is no reason why it is not available 99% of the time.

ERAP assessed the severity of significant engineering risks arising from potential technical faults or breakdowns in terms of safety risk, particularly process safety, reliability and repair cost risk and environmental risk. This was followed by a forward look at possible investment scenarios indicating the best value.

The head of Eskom Engineering, a member of the Executive Committee (EXCO), could then put engineering risk and plant conditions into a language that EXCO and the board can understand.

My submission is that this is the missing link today. I am not convinced that EXCO and the board have a solid appreciation of Eskom’s engineering risks and plant conditions today.

This is why the unplanned capability loss factor post-unit outages is 34%. It should be less than 10%. The partial load losses are more than 6,000 MW when they should never exceed 3,000 MW in summer.

According to Isabel Fick, the General Manager for system operations at Eskom, variability over the rest of the network is about 4,000 MW. It means the load-shedding prognosis in the next 24 hours ranges from no load-shedding up to four stages of load-shedding.

Therefore, managing plant reliability and predictivity is of crucial importance. In addition, as a last resort for electricity supply, the government must prevent load-shedding in police stations, public schools, and hospitals.

The route adopted from 2015 to 2017 in collaboration with RWE nPower was to predict the most likely risk of breakdowns as accurately as possible well in advance, including a profile of the duration of breakdowns and making sure that the combined sum of breakdowns and planned outages are within the maintenance budget of 11,500 MW in summer and 8,500 MW in winter. It is called the Tetris Maintenance Tool and is supported by ERAP.

The head of Eskom Engineering took EXCO and the board with them in taking major risk-based engineering decisions, e.g. re-engineering and the modular spare replacement strategy.

The Engineering Group judged maintenance intervals and scope based on, but not always, following the original equipment manufacturers’ (OEM) recommendations. The government and Eskom board often exaggerate the roles of OEMs in power plant reliability.

This is another example that the government and Eskom board do not appreciate the engineering risks and plant conditions at Eskom plants.

The critical chain in power plant maintenance is always through the turbine centerline. The rule of thumb is that it should never exceed 60 days, breaker-to-breaker, unless the unit is undergoing a modernisation exercise, which should happen once in the station’s lifetime. This is enabled by the modular spare strategy, which was approved by the board of Eskom in 2012.

The plan was to procure a new turbine as a spare to be fitted at each power station, and the old turbine would be removed for repairs and then stored at Rotek.

During this period, a thorough analysis would be conducted to affect proper maintenance and life extension, thus making the turbine ready for fitting on a rotational basis. Modular spares were procured from Siemens and Alstom at R888,000,000 and R3,691,960.00, respectively.

Eskom also concluded a contract with Alstom to provide 36 Technical Field Advisors, including a technology and knowledge transfer mechanism, for a three-year term at a value of €43.61 million.

The modular spares were all delivered in 2017. The modular spares workshop at Rotek was completed in 2016.

The technical partnership with RWE nPower set Eskom up for success. That is why the lights were kept on reliably from 2015 to 2017. Eskom should go back to basics. South Africans do not deserve load-shedding.